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i. INTRODUCTION
For much of the past decade, the world has applauded the striking development
performance of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Despite the setbacks caused by the
present financial crisis in Asia, the rap id strctural transformation and improvement in
the standard of living in these three countres remains a powerful testament to the
benefits of a strategy emphasizing industri al exports. In the first half of the 1990s, when
gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 2 percent anually in Sub-Saharan Afrca, GDP
grew at over 8 percent per year in the three Southeast Asian countres. During the same
period, exports from Afrca grew by 2.5 percent anually, and the three Southeast Asian
countres pushed their export growth to an average 13.1 percent. 1 Afrcan countres
have tended to remain commodity exporters, and while Afrca has so far remained
largely untouched by the "Asian flu", the continent also missed out on the benefits of
engagement with the global market.
Why has Southeast Asia developed such a dynamic industral export sector, while
Sub-Saharan Afrca has not? UntIl the recent financial crisis, most analyses argued that
Southeast Asia had "developmental states", while Sub-Saharan Afrca was cursed with
corrpt and neopatrimonial govemance. The developmental states of Southeast Asia
were credited for putting in place the fudamentals of macroeconomic stability and
investment in education, and orienting policy to favor exports, or at least to create a
level playing field between exports and imports. They were said to have engaged their
private sectors in high-Ievel "deliberative councIls", designing and implementing
policies that encouraged productivity and effciency. However, the financial crisis put
this interpretation into question. In the aftermath ofthe crisis, the Southeast Asian states
are now being castigated for their high levels of patronage, corrption, and business-
state collusion. They are described in terms strkingly simIlar to those us ed to describe
Afrcan states.
It remains a littIe too soon to put naIls in the coffn of the Southeast Asian
developmental state. However, the Asian mirac1e always had a societal side, one that a
state-centric focus largely missed. Many who wish to compare Southeast Asia and Sub-
Saharan Afrca point to the structural simIlarties between the two regions: simIlar
commodity export histories, similar GNP/per capita in the 1960s, etc. Yet the
differences between the two regions are signficant, and particularly so in their
experience of entrepreneurial development. This paper suggests that Southeast Asia's
lead over Sub-Saharan Afrca is not simply a response to good policies undertaken in the
past two decades, but rather also reflects the different ways in which each area first
engaged with the capitalist world, the paths indigenous and non-indigenous
entrepreneurs took and the experiences they accumulated durng the colonial period and
after, and the subsequent depth and breadth of the business networks and globallinkages
that characterize the entrepreneurs of each region.
When seen historically, three striking differences emerge between Sub-Saharan
Afrca and Southeast Asia. First, Southeast Asia was well integrated into international
l Export figures refer to 1990-1995 and are from World Bank (1997); growf figures refer to 1990-1996
and are from World Bank (1998).
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martime trading networks several centuries before martime trade reached most of Sub-
Saharan Afrca. The lower cost and greater ease of martime trade meant that traders in
Southeast Asia could develop business skills, be exposed to outside innovations, and
accumulate significant capital much earlier than was possible for many in Afrca. As
part ofthis maritime mobility, waves ofChinese and Indian immigrants settled in
Southeast Asia and were to become signficant elements in the area's economic
development. In contrast, Afrca's experience ofpre-colonial maritime trade focused on
a small stretch of East Afrca, bypassing most of the continent. Settlement of Asian
immigrants took place much later as welL Finally, once martime commerce reached
into Central and West Afrca, it focused almost exc1usively on the slave trade, and this
also affected the continents later trajectory. Second, signficant import-substitution
industrialization began in Southeast Asia in the late 19th century, three or more decades
before any significant modem industrial development occurred in Afrca, giving Asian
entrepreneurs and workers a longer history of experience with industrialization. Third,
proximity to Japan served as a powerful catalyst for entrepreneural development in
Southeast Asia. Japanese firms appear to be much more likely to enter into joint
ventures in manufacturing with domestic firms, and at a lower level oftechnology than
western firms. Afrcan entrepreneurs had no simIlar, "appropriate" catalyst. Direct
foreign investments in Afrca are still much more likely to be in mining, petroleum, and
other primar commodity extraction ventures.
This paper reviews the state of the knowledge about local entrepreneurship in
Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Afrca. It continues with a brief discussion of
entrepreneurship and several related issues and questions. It then provides a short socIal
history of entrepreneurial development in both regions. The fourth section reviews the
enabling conditions and constraints facing local entrepreneurs in both regions. The
conc1usion suggests some policy recommendations and are as for fuher research.
Il. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Entrepreneurs are the bedrock of the capitalist system, and their development has
to be seen in the context of the development of societies that allow and even encourage
private accumulation of capital for investment. Although traders are the foundation of a
market economy, it is primarly the rise in broad-based manufacturng investment and
the social division into owners and workers that distinguishes a pre-capitalist from a
capitalist system. This study focuses primarilyon entrepreneurship in the "modem"
manufactung sector. Entrepreneurs are the founders and leaders ofbusinesses, a group
separate from business managers, but with many of the same concems. Even with these
limits, there are a number of dimensions of entrepreneurship that need to be understood
in order to leam from comparisons. First, entrepreneurs need to be studied as
individuals whose histories and capacities make up much of the dynamic force of an
economy. Second, we need to understand the relations between entrepreneurs .and the
state: under what conditions do societies move from state-business relations
characterized by patronage, cronyism, and corrption, to those characterized more by
productivity, dynamism, and synergy? Third, we need to explore the linkages between
and among entrepreneurs: their networks, c1usters, and associations, and the ways in
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which these linkages are globalized.
Most of the studies of entrepreneurship in these two regions examine
entrepreneurs as individuals, often inc1uding life (or firm) histories or an assessment of
the capacity and "modemity" of a country or region's businesses. These studies have
their roots in several traditions. Modernzation theorists during the 1950s and 1960s
studied the extent to which entrepreneurs in both regions possessed the attitudes and
skills necessar for modem business development. Both academics and politicians
expressed doubt over the ability of local entrepreneurs in both regions to provide the
driving force for economic development. This set of concerns survives in recent studies
that examine the relative capacity, productivity and effciency oflocal firms and firms
owned by foreigners, as well as those that address the debate over whether or not each
region is developing a "tre" indigenous capitalism, or some distorted "ersatz" or
"comprador" varent, and those that examine entrepreneurship and ethncity.
The relationship between entrepreneurs and the state entaIls another level of
analysis, one that examines the collective development of entrepreneurs, not their
individual growth. Several concerns arse here. An effective capitalist system requires a
state that provides an "enabling environment" for business, but which is able to maintain
some autonomy and avoid "captue" by the business c1ass. Relationships that are too
c10se degenerate into rent-seeking and "cronyism" or "pariah" capitalism, the kind found
under Marcos in the Philippines or Abacha in Nigeria. Relationships that are too distant
ru the risk that the state wI1 not see the promotion of business as an important goal,
resulting in an overregulated or even hostIle environment, such as that under Rawlings
in the early 1980s in Ghana, or Indonesia under Sukaro. A developed business c1ass
(or capitalist c1ass) has a self-consciousness that enables it to prornote its interests. One
ofthe puzzles in the study of entrepreneurs and the state remains: under what conditions
does the business c1ass see its interests being met by policies that promote capital
accumulation through productivity increases and competition, rather than through
protection and rent-seeking? Another puzzle focuses on the cohesiveness of the
business c1ass: when do divisive forces like ethncity and nationality become less
important than the interests broadly shared by entrepreneurs?
Finally, a critical area for research on entrepreneurship covers the relationships
among entrepreneurs and firms: the links, networks and c1usters that provide
information, assistance and examples, stimulate innovation, and transfer technology and
skills. Robert Wade noted that the relationships among firms and other aspects of finn
organzation should have a "central place" in any study ofindustrialization, admitting
that his inability to say very much on this issue was "a major gap" in his 1990 study of
East Asian industrialization (1990: 70). Peter Evans' work on embedded autonomy
partially remedied this gap, with its c10se examination of the interlinkages between state
and business in India, Korea, and BrazIl (1995). Yet even Evans' impressive bóok placed
primar emphasis on governent, and secondary emphasis on the ways in which
governent interacts with business. Businesses themselves, and the many-stranded
networks that link businesses together, received scant attention.
Very recently, however, research has begun to tease out the implications of the
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multistranded relationships that comprise industri al c1usters, and local and international
business networks. These relationships may range from intricately linked business
groups, with overlapping directorates and share ownership, to networks of information
formed through trade or membership in business associations or social c1ubs. One set of
studies proceeds from the idea that industrialization can be facIlitated by Marshallian
industrial distrcts which produce economies of agglomeration. Clusters of enterprises
in simi1ar or re1ated industres can be found throughout Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan
Afrca. Geographic propinquity may generate economic benefits for entrepreneurs, but
this must be established, not assumed. Among the potential benefits are lower costs of
production throughjoint marketing or joint purchase ofinputs, or lower transaction
costs through sharng information about market demand, reliable sources of technology
and equipment, or supplies; equipment sharing; access to working capital;
subcontracting opportunities; informal techncal assistance, etc. Harard Business
School professor Michael Porter highlights these c1usters as an important component of
"competitive advantage", arguing that when industres are geographically concentrated,
domestic rivalries are magnfied, and rivalry is a potent force that goads entrepreneurs
into keeping up with their neighbors (1990: 149).
Another set of researchers approach the question oflinkages via a focus on
economic organization. Organization theory and some branches of economics examine
the institutional forces that shape entrepreneurs' strategic decisions about firm structure:
vertically-integrated hierarchies, or looser, horizontally-linked enterprise groups
(common in both Southeast Asia and Afrca) and subcontracting arangements for
example.2 A current thread within this research examines the question of "trust" and
"social capital" in comparative perspective. In more comp1ex societies, trst is less
necessar for exchange, since cours and other impersonal institutions of contract
enforcement provide incentives to follow through on agreements. In less complex
societies, famIliarty, reputation and ascriptive characteristics such as shared ethncity
substitute for formal enforcement, smoothing transactions and allowing contracts to be
upheld. It is possible that societies differ in the degree to which their history and shared
sense oftrust has created the kind of socIal capital that facilitates effcient exchange and
investment.
The discussion above outlnes most of the issues that concern us as we look
comparatively at local entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Afrca.
Each region has grappled with a set of challenges inherent in the transition from
traditional (pre-capitalist) to "modem" capitalist systems. Technical and learnng
challenges provide one set: how do entrepreneurs gain access to the skI1s and machinery
that wI1 enable them to be intemationally competitive? How do they break into
international markets? But the political and socIal challenges of business development
are equally vexing. Entrepreneural opportnities in each region tend to be skewed
toward certain ethnic groups (often expatrate). What are the development implications
when the industr al dynamism in an economy comes primarily from foreign or non-
indigenous local investment? Finally, the political influence of entrepreneurs and their
relationship with the state shape the incentives business receives and the ways in which
2 Same of the relevant works include Coase (1937); Wiliamson (1975, 1985); Granavetter (1985) and
Feenstra, Huang and Hamilton (1997).
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accumulation occurs. Ruth Mc V ey once described a business promotion program in the
Phillippines as "a giant porkbarrel into which politicians and their frends, newly dubbed
entrepreneurs, dipped their fingers" (1992: 1 1). Can a business dass formed through
rent-seeking and "crony" capitalism evolve over time in a more competitive and
efficient direction or must it be largely destroyed through liberalization, so that
something new can emerge?
III. ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN COMP ARTIVE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Afrca differ shar ly in the extent of time each
has been exposed to the stimulus, learing and accumulation opportnities inherent in
international trade networks. Southeast Asia is strategically located along the great
ocean trade routes between India and China. The spices of Southeast Asia brought
Indian traders in the first century AD. and Chinese traders to the region by the 5th
century AD.. International trade had grown substantially by 1000 AD., as Chinese and
Indian traders visited trading ports from Malacca to Kerala. Between the 1300s and
1600s, indigenous entrepreneurs also played a major role in Southeast Asian trade:
Malays, Sulus, Javanese and others contrbuted the bulk of the goods, ships, and finance
for trade (Brown, 1994: 6).
Durng this period, Sub-Saharan Afrca was markedly less linked to international
trading circuits. Swahili Arab traders plied small vessels along the coasts of East Afrca,
establishing trading ports in Zanibar and northem Mozambique by the 10tl1 ceiitur and
exporting ivory and gold. Except for an odd series of expeditions organized by the
Ming Dynast y in the early 15th century, the Chinese had no contact with Afrca. Indian
trading ships, limited by the monsoon winds, reached only to the coasts of Kenya by the
15tl1 centur (Austen 1987: 59). Camel caravans moved across the Sahara into the Sahel
and Savanah regions, but then trade routes generally broke down into short distance
"relays". The very different geography made transport much more difficult and
impeded trade links. Furthermore, the Western coast was almost completely cllt off
from signficant outside contacts until the 16th century. As Oliver and Atmore's history
of the Afrcan Middle Ages notes, in 1400, there were no ships at all in the oceans
between southem Morocco and what is now South Afrca, and "for those living between
these points the ocean marked the end of the world" (1981: 16).
It was not until the arrval ofEuropeans and the marked acceleration of the slave
trade that the many small, regional trading networks were finally linkedwith the earlier
trans-Saharan and East Afrcan coastal trade into a continent-wide system in the late
18th century. Yet even then, in West Afrca, there was little that could be termed
indigenous, long-distance trade:
traders faI1ed to develop market networks and merchant estates which transcended
geographical and cultural boundares. Goods moving to or from the coast were
therefore not carred by single caravans or agents ofthe same organization over wide
distances, but instead passed by a system of relays from one ethnic group to another
across terrtories often defined by shifts from overland to water routes (Austen" 1987:
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91).
UntIl the demand for Afrca's industri al raw materials rose in the mid-19th century,
neither production nor trade grew in a sustained maner (Sender and Smith 1986: 8).
This contrasted shar ly with Southeast Asia during the same period, where trade was
already a significant feature of the local economy.
Colonialism brought intense competition and often brutal suppression for
indigenous traders in both regions. In the 17th centu, Portguese and Dutch trading
groups fragmented the "vibrant indigenous trading circuits" of Southeast Asia which
"failed to surive into the colonial era" (Brown, 1994: 11). The Chinese and Indian
immigrants, on the other hand, were able to draw on the resources of ethnic networks
and to make themselves useful to the colonial powers. Their investments and trading
networks rivaled those of the Europeans. Some wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs in
Southeast gave credit to European merchants, and others had important roles as
middlemen.
In Sub-Saharan Afrca, Portguese efforts to captue the gold and ivory trade
greatly reduced the activities of the Arabs who had traded along the east coast. The
Portguese dominance and the low level of accumulation detered local groups from
gaining much of a foothold in trade, although the Indian merchants who had earlier
settled along the coast were able to maintain and even expand their trading businesses
and have been credited with introducing the money economy to East Afrca (Himbara,
1994: 22; 37). In West Afrca, as colonial trading enterprises penetrated further into the
interior, they used their exc1usive charers, greater access to capital, and the protection of
colonial authorities to force their nascent Afrcan competition out ofbusiness. In
Nigeria in the 1880s, for example, Jaja of Opobo, a successful indigenous trader with
some several thousand employees, had begu to export palm oil directly to England,
threatening European dominance of the export trade. He was driven out ofbusIness by
the British.3 Likewise, in Southem Afrca, the colonial powers protected European
traders by tightly controlling the entry of Afrcans (Nicolas, 1994: 96). In the early
colonial period, these moves may have kept most indigenous Afrcan entrepreneurs from
accumulating capitalon any significant scale.4
By the late 19th centu, both regions were on different paths. Southeast Asia
moved into modem manufactung well before Afrca, with almost exc1usively foreign
and Chinese or Indian investment. The first phase of industr al development in
Southeast Asia -- cement production, food canng, beer, soap and biscuit manufacture,
rubber processing and other basic industries -- began between 1860 and 1914, with the
production of chemicals, refined sug ar, light machinery, cyc1es, paper, textIles and other
3 The challenge of 
West African indigenous traders and the respanse of the colonial power are discussed
in Gertel (1962), Nwabughuogu (1982), and Ofonagoro (1979).
4 There exists same disagreement among scholars on whether the colonial state impeded indigenous
capital accumulation in East Africa. Himbara (1994) recounts numerous instances of colonial support for
local entrepreneurs, but his earliest accounts date from the 1940s. Marris and Samers et (1971), Brett
(1973) and Swainson (1980) all argue that local entrepreneurs were restricted by direct colonial action.
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goods well in place by 1930.5 Dunlop invested in rubber plantations in Malaya in the
early 1910s, Goodyear in Sumatra.
Yet even in Southeast Asia, the development of industry was uneven. In
Thailand, the monarchy had been pressured into signng the Bowring treaty by the
British, which limited tarffs on all imports to 3 percent, between 1855 and 1926 (Akira
1989: 21). These levels ofprotection, the lowest in all of Asia, allowed littIe scope for
import substitution industralization in Thailand. Consequently, industri al development
was slow. Steam-powered rice mills were established in Bangkok by the 1870s, but by
1919, Bangkok had only a cement plant, cigarette factory, soap and leather factories, and
several soda bottling plants, in addition to a number of large-scale rice mI1s (49 by
1908) and saw mills. With the repeal of the Bowing treaty in 1926, Thailand was able to
impose trade barrers to stimulate domestic industry. Cotton mils and apaper factory
were established in 1935, modem white sugar refining began only in 1937, and the first
textile factory in 1939 (?), dates that are not dissimilar to those in some of Afrca's more
progressive economies, such as Kenya.
The colonial authorities in Indonesia also introduced quotas on textiles in the
1930s to stimulate textile production. As intended, this pushed domestic capital (mainly
Chinese) and foreign capital into manufacturing. As Y oshihara (1988: 113) recounts it,
Some traders went into manufacturing because the goods they were importing could no
longer be imported. For them, entr into manufacturing was a strategy for survivaL
Others went in seeing a great opportnity to make profits under the protection and
incentives offered by the governent.
The colonial authorities in Malaysia, on the other hand, maintained essentially laissez-
faire policies until a 1955 World Ban report urged Malaysia to raise tarffs on
manufactued goods to stimulate import-substitution industralization (Jesudason, 1990:
48).
By 1941, although Southeast Asian industralization could still be described as
"patchy", it was well underway, led by Chinese, Indian, European and Japanese
entrepreneurs, and already involving production for export: "Entrepreneurs had
identified potential areas of investment and us ed their trading base to take the
opportnities for specific industri al initiatives. They initially targetted the domestic
market and later, through careIs, attempted to secure a market share in Asia" (Brown,
1994: 249-250). Even at this early point, the economies of Southeast Asia had already
become well-integrated with extensive intra-regional trade and investment, although it
was to take until the industri al policies of the late 1950s and 1960s for manufacturing to
"take-off'.
In contrast, the initial development of manufacturing in Sub-Saharan Afrca
lagged Southeast Asia's by some 30 to 40 years, and no region of the continent is
anywhere near being well-integrated.6 Entrepreneurs in Kenya established the first
5 The discussion of the dates ofindustralization in Southeast Asia draws on Akira (1989), Brown (1994).
6 For discussions on the dates ofindustrialization in Africa, see Himbara (1994: 39); Rapley (1994);
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rudimentary factories at the turn ofthe centur, tannng leather, ginning cotton, and
making furnture. But in general, Afrcan industrialization appears to have begun
primarly in the 1920s and 1930s. Uganda's Madhvani Group began manufacturing
sugar in the 1920s, and the first factories in Nigeria appear to have been established in
the 1920s. In one of the more advanced regions, Côte d'Ivoire, industr al development
was almost nonexistent until the 1940s. Indigenous entrepreneurs in Côte d'Ivoire
tended to focus on plantation agrculture, and diversify into services (transport,
moneylending) and real estate. And despite the initial investments in Kenya, Kenyan
manufacurng was "still in its infancy" before World War Il (Himbara 1994: 43). Being
cut off from extemal supplies during World War Il acted as a stimulus for import
substitution industrialization in pars of Afrca, as in Latin America. As Afrcan
countries moved c10ser to independence, some colonial authorities began to implement
import substitution policies. In the 1950s, Nigerian authorities raised tarffleve1s on
some c1asses of imports that were also produced in Nigeria, and Kenyan authorities
developed a duty drawback scheme for imported raw materials us ed in manufacturing
exports. But in general, policies to stimulate domestic industry would wait until after
independence.
Industral development clearly has an ethnic dimension in each region. Both
Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Afrca have found their indigenous entrepreneurs
getting a later start than the Chinese, Indian, and other foreign entrepreneurs who
entered as long-term residents. The Chinese and Indians have been a presence in
Southeast Asia for more than a thousand years. The Chinese in paricular have become
important percentages oflocal populations. In 1981, about 33 percent ofMalaysians, 13
percent of Thais, and about 3 percent of Indonesians were ofChinese descent (Mackie,
1992: 163). Several centuries ago, local rulers used the resident Chinese for "Úix
faring" which enabled them to raise revenues without the risk of accruing obligations
(and demands for power-sharing) from their indigenous noble families. Tax farming
worked synergistically: the Chinese identified a sector or product that could be
monopolized, obtained an agreement to control its production or distrbution, and paid a
fixed rent to the ruler, while keeping the surlus. Tax farming became a lucrative source
of capital accumulation for Chinese business families, while also establishing the
Chinese as auseful "comprador" for royal interests.
By the start of the 20th centu, Southeast Asia had many, very large Chinese
family firms, already diversified into a number of activities. The Khaw family, for
example, began their accumulation in the 19th century as tax farers in Hong Kong and
Southeast Asia, and moved in the early 20th century into insurance, shipping, and tin
mining and smelting in Siam (Thailand), Burma and the Malay States. Their
investments inc1uded severaljoint ventures with Australian companies, Chettiar groups,
and other Chinese (Brown, 1994: 87). Chinese firms in Southeast Asia dominated small-
scale industry in the 1930s and 1940s, and moved increasingly into larger-scale
manufacturing in the 1950s, although they tended still at that time to concentrate in
sectors with simpler technology: garments, molded plastics, wood products, and paper,
leaving the more complex sectors to foreign investment. The entire first wave of
Sender and Smith, (1986: 12-13; 28). See also Kennedy, Ilife, Forrest in DC.
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business activity in Southeast Asia depended heavily on foreign and Chinese .
investment. In 1937, half of the capital invested in Thailand came from Chinese
businesses, and the Chinese controlled almost a third of the capital in Malaya-
Singapore, and 10 percent in Indonesia (Mackie, 1992: 164).
Chinese, Indians and Lebanese immigrants first settled in Afrca much later than
in Southeast Asia. The earliest to arve were the Indians who came to trade in the Arab
ports along the East Afrcan coast, exporting ivory and c10ves back to India. By the
early 19th centur, there were some six thousand Indians settled along the coast, and, as
in Southeast Asia, some had become important sources of finance for both local and
expatrate commerce (Hollingsworth 1960: 28). Indian traders from the coast began
moving into the interior in East Africa in the first decades of the 19th century. Indian
immigrants began to arve in significant numbers in East and Southem Afrca, and
Mauritius, as laborers in the building of railroads and in plantations, while others
continued to come as traders throughout the 19th century (Kuczynski, 1948; Bowman,
1991: 20). In Maurtius, Chinese traders already numbered several thousand by the
1780s. By the mid-1840s, the Port-Louis market in Mauritius was "dominated" by
Chinese traders, and two decades later, one visitor reported, "'in every out-of-the-way
nook and corner of the island' you found 'a Chinaman's shop'." (Snow, 1988: 55).
However, with the exception of Mauritius (where the Chinese population is currently
about 30,000), Madagascar (10,000), and South Afrca (10,000), Chinese immigration
was not significant in any Afrcan country (Bowman, 1991: 44; Snow, 1988: 57). By
the 1930s, some Indian firms like Chellarams, a Sindh Indian trading company with
branches in Southeast Asia, the UK, the Middle East, the West Indies, and West Afrca,
and the Chandara Group, with subsidiares in Kenya, Nigeria and elsewhere, had
become tre multinationals. Levantine traders (Syrans and Lebanese) came
predominantly to West Afrca, arving in Nigeria in the mid-1890s, where they became
traders and transporters.
As the colonial period came to a close, indigenous Afrcan entrepreneurs remained
concentrated in the service sector: trade, transport, real estate, and constrction, where
some amassed considerable investment. Others set up mills, bakeri es, and other light
industries but very rarelyon any significant scale. For indigenous entrepreneurs in
Southeast Asia, the situation was not very different. Even in the most advanced country,
Malaysia, indigenous firms remained "feeble" and concentrated in batik printing, rattan
products and other handicrafts (Jesudason, 1990: 64). One handicap indigenous
entrepreneurs had was their inability to, as one study reported, "develop business
networks" (Yoshihara, 1988: 55).
In both regions, it was non-indigenous entrepreneurs who had accumulated the
networks, capital, and business skI1s, and who had the globallinkages necessar to
begin the transition from commerce to modem manufacturing. European capital in
Nigeria first began to shift into larger-scale, import-substitution manufacturing after
1957 as a defensive reaction to new tarffs on imports (Forrest, 1994: 25). Kenyan
Indians ("Asians") who had stared out in commerce and baning in the late 19th
centu, slowly moved into manufacturing in the 1920s. By the 1950s, they were
producing on a large and diversified scale, and by the mid-1980s, one study conc1uded
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that "Kenyan manufacturing industry is almost exc1usively owned by multinational
corporations, Kenyan Asians, or governent parastatals; Afrcans own very few
medium or large-sized manufacturing firms" (Coughlin, 1988: 293).
Ethicity became an important political issue in both regions, as colonial
governents reconsidered economic development strategies in the post World War Il
period. After independence, pressure grew for the new leadership to interveneto create
opportunities for indigenous capitaL A number of Afrcan countries, such as Kenya and
Nigeria, attempted to promote indigenous Afrcan business by new licencing
requirements and regulations that pressured Lebanese and Indian entrepreneurs to vacate
trading and small-scale services (leaving these for Afrcan entrepreneurs), and move
their capital into more sophisticated manufacturing. Some, like Uganda, expelled their
Asian population.
Malaysia's New Economic Policy (NP), put in place in 1971, was the most
explicit effort to boost business opportunties for indigenous capitaL. The governent
pledged that by 1990, Malays and Malay interests would own at least 30 percent of the
corporate capital in the country. Dozens of programs were put in place to promote
Malay entrepreneurship. One effect ofthe NEP was that the proportion of Chinese
investment in manufacturing fell by about 50 percent, as concern rose about the security
oftheir property rights (Jesudason, 1990: 143). Much of the difference was made up
through state corporations, often injoint ventues with foreign firms. Up until-the mid-
1960s, Indonesian policies did little to support entrepreneurship for any ethnc group.
As development economist Benj amin Higgins charged in 1963, "the story of Java seems
to be one of repeated nipping off of a budding entrepreneural upsurge by a political elite
essentially hostile to it" (1963: ix). After the 1965 coup, policy became more nurring,
targetting in paricular the "pribumi" or indigenous Indonesians. Yet at present, Chinese
Indonesians contribute some 70 percent of domestic investment, and they also continue
to bear the wrath of the indigenous people whenever the economy slumps (Weidenbaum
and Hughes, 1996: 25). Several thousand Chinese have been killed recently in: the riots
accompanying the price hikes introduced by the governent to address the economic
crisis. Thailand, which was never colonized, followed a policy aimed at assimilation.
The Family Name Act and the Nationality Act of 1913 led many resident Chinese to
take Thai family names and Thai nationality. Although some official policies of ethnc
discrimination existed, they were abandoned in the late 1950s. Thais of Chinese descent
dominate business in Thailand, holding some 90 percent ofinvestments (Akira, 1989:
9).
By the end ofthe 20th century, despite the recent setbacks, the strctual
transformation and industr al advance of Southeast Asia is still substantially better than
most of Afrca. Manufacturing output first exceeded agrcultural output in Thailand in
1981, in Malaysia in 1984, and in Indonesia in 1991. By 1991, only four Sub-Saharan
countres -- Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Afrca, and Mauritius -- had reached that level of
strctural transformation. Governent policies were critical in creating, or not creating,
an "enabling environment" for entrepreneurs in both regions, but as the discussion above
points out, for varous reasons, history has presented different paths to different groups
of entrepreneurs in each region. Some have thus been more able than others to draw on
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networks and other informal institutions for support, accumulate substantial capital, and
be exposed to mo dels of capitalist rationality and extemal catalysts who can provide the
ideas and the strategy for an initial industri al investment.
IV. LOCAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AN GLOBAL LINGES:
ENABLING CONDITIONS AN CONSTRATS
What do entrepreneurs need in order to invest successfully in manufactung? At
a basic leve!, paricularly ifthey are traders thinking about moving their capital into a
fixed investment, they need a political and economic environment with a certain degree
of stability and predictability and some incentives, or at least the absence of strong
disincentives for investment. They also need good infrastrcture: roads, ports, a
constant supply of electrcity and water, and reliable telecommuncations. On an
institutionallevel, they need contract enforcement and security of propert. This can be
supplied by the state, or by informal systems based on reputation or sanctions of
exc1usion. Finally, entrepreneurs are tasked with gathering the "inputs" to the
production process: ideas and information about opportnities and markets, investment
finance and working capital, sources for technology and inputs, and skilled personneI.
In this section we consider the enabling conditions and constraints faced by lo,?al
entrepreneurs in both regions. The section begins with a review of networks and
clusters as institutions that strengthen entrepreneurs individually and collectively,
continues with a discussion of relationships between entrepreneurs and the state, and
conc1udes with a review of foreign investment links. We argue that different local
groups have developed different histories oflinkage to the global economy, to ideas and
resources outside their locality, and to the state, and that this explains an important par
ofthe ability of some groups to embark on dynamic industrialization.
Networks and Global Linkages
An entrepreneur seeking to enter industry faces high transaction and learng
costs. N etworks are one way in which entrepreneurs reduce search costs while also
lowering the risks of embarking on a new ventue. Industral distrcts, or clusters of
contiguous and often related enterprises, are one way in which networks form.
However, today, in an increasingly competitive world, networks need to be globaL
Globallinkages are critical for passing on information and ideas, providing catalysts and
capital, and for gaining experience via learng from others. V erticallinkages among
firms are formed through subcontracting: larger firms (often international) subcontract
pars and processes to smaller ( often domestic) firms. Horizontallinkages are those
between more or less equals, and are formed either through geographical proximity
(c1usters), or networks. Globallinkages occur most frequently through trade.
Trading networks have always existed outside of the arificial boundares
established by states, and both Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Afrca today have
impressive trading groups with extensive global contacts. Although many hope that
small-scale arisans will make the transition to modem manufactung, local
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entrepreneurs who start manufactung ventures in less developed countries seem more
likely to begin as traders. Trade provides a vehic1e for capital accumulation and an
intimate knowledge of markets and distribution. Travel provides exposure to new ideas
and sources of information. Furthermore, traders that are part of an ethnic network have
other advantages. As Weidenbaum and Hughes point out: "in a region where capital
markets are rudimentary, financial disc10sure is limited, and contract law very weak,
interpersonal networks are critical to moving economic resources across political
boundaries" (1996: 53). Weidenbaum and Hughes were describing East Asia, and of
course, these conditions apply even more in Sub-Saharan Afrca.
As the histories above make c1ear, both regions have different experiences of
entrepreneurial accumulation, network formation, and globallinkages. The Chinese
and, less so, the Indian networks of Asia are legendary (Chan, 1992; Feenstra, Huang
and Hamilton, 1997; Hamilton, 1996; McVey, 1992; Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996).
Based originally on ties ofkinship and of dialect, these networks provided credit,
preferential distrbution agreements, advice, information and contacts for their members.
Extended family and locality-of-origin connections enabled Chinese networks of the
18th and 19th centuries to expand easily beyond national boundares, reduce search
costs, and resolve problems oftrust. As the first generations oftrading families
reproduced, the following generations had those networks to draw on, and expand. The
challenges of entering manufacturng from a family with its roots in agrculture,
arisanr, or even governent service, are much steeper.
Afrcan traders and other entrepreneurs also have extensive networks. Indeed,
Hausa and Igbo trading networks are also "legendary" in West Afrca. Likewise,
clusters of enterprises are commonly found in Afrca: the Suame Magazine in l(umasi,
Ghana, for example. Much less research has been done on the nature ofthese c1usters
and networks as they facilitate modem industri al development. One exception is the
study of a c1uster of modem spare parts factories in the Igbo town ofNnewi in eastem
Nigeria (Bräutigam, 1997).
The Igbo of eastem Nigeria live in one of the more densely populated areas of
Afrca, which may explain why their people became traders, settling in other regions of
Nigeria and of West Afrca, but always maintaining their connections to eastem Nigeria.
Nnewi entrepreneurs entered the palm oil market at the end ofthe 19th century,
producing, collecting and later transporting palm oiL. The area became a noted center
for transport and a market for spare parts consequently sprang up. Durng the colonial
period, several businessmen, including Philip Ojuk, amassed considerable wealth
through their transport businesses, one of the few areas that were open to indigenous
entrepreneurs (Silverstein, 1984). By the 1930s, Nnewi people were at the center of an
international trading network that dominated the supply of motor spare parts. Like the
Chinese, Nnewi traders us ed family networks, c1ustering close relatives at the center of
each web of distrbution, and non-relatives (but generally co-ethncs) at the outer edges.
Although at first spare parts were imported primarily from Europe, Asian
entrepreneurs soon penetrated the market, offering to produce copies ofthe European
"original" brand name pars. Nnewi's first Asian contacts were with Japan, but soon
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Chinese networks based in Taiwan came to dominate the supply of motor vehic1e spare
pars with their "reproductions" of European brandname pars (Alutu, 1986: 221).
Gradually Nnewi motor parts traders began marketing their own brand name products
instead of the reproductions of "original" pars. These, too, were generally made in
Taiwan. The great majority of industrialists in the c1uster of spare pars factories in
Nnewi are also traders, and most ofthese are producing one or more ofthe products they
specialize in as traders (usually motor vehicle pars), and most began by distributing
their products through their preexisting distribution networks. Family networks
remained a factor, although they were weaker in manufacturng than in trade.
Nigerian traders received extensive exposure to production in Asia once their
businesses grew large enough for the traders to make the trp to Asia for goods instead
ofwaiting at home for Asian traders. One medium-sized manufactuer ofplastic auto
parts and batleries related how in the early 1980s his trading business had grown large
enough for him to travel to the Far East to meet with his suppliers in Japan: "I saw their
plant and how they produced, and I felt in could produce these items at home, I could
give people jobs, transfer technology to Nigeria, and make more profit." Another
manufacturer commented, "For eight years I imported these things and saw how simple
they were to make. So I decided to start manufacturing them. "
Nnewi industralists generally us ed imported machinery (sometimes sec ond-hand)
one step down the product cyc1e, at the technicalleve1 now being outgrown in the East
Asian NICs. Some entrepreneurs were able to import machines from the factories they
had been trading with in Asia. For example, an oil filter manufacturer bought out the
Singapore firm who us ed to supply his business. In so doing, of course, NnewI
entrepreneurs were following the experience of Taiwan and Korea, who leared from
Japan's slightly outdated production practices. Their extensive international ties gave
them access to information that simply did not exist inside Nigeria: information on
modem, medium-scale production technologies that Asian firms were beginning to
outgrow. These contacts, combined with the advantages of the strong distrbution
system and the access to credit facilitated by ethnc ties, underpinned the lower
transaction costs enjoyed by Nnewi entrepreneurs seeking to enter industry.
Another case of Afrca-Asia networks can be found in Maurtius. Maurtius was
the first Afrcan countr to establish export processing zones (EPZ), in 1970, soon after
independence. The idea for the EPZ seems to have come from a prominent Sino-
Maurtian professor, Sir E. Lim Fat, whose family was originally from the Canton area,
and who was linked through his brother-in-Iaw's family to Chinese in Taiwan, where he
visited the worlds first EPZ. Taiwan offered technical assistance for establishing the
zones, and the Sino-Maurtians advertised the opportnities through their contacts in
Asia, and invested in the zones themselves. Between 1971 and 1975, EPZ exports grew
at 31 percent per anum. Although expansion in the zones then went through a slower
period, foreign investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan surged in the mid- and late
1980s, becoming the nucleus of a thrving knitwear and garent export industry. By the
late 1980s, Maurtius was the third largest exporter ofkntwear in the world.
Early in the life of the EPZs, joint ventues between East Asian and local investors
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were common, although this was not a requirement for foreign investment. Because
Mauritius had wealthy entrepreneurs with the capital to invest and the desire to lear the
business, while the Asian firms needed the capital, risk-sharng, and the local knowledge
and contacts, joint ventues were genuine, not "paper" parerships.
Although Mauritius relied initially on foreign investment and their production and
marketing knowledge, entrepreneurs in Mauritius were quick to also take advantage of
the business opportnities presented by knitwear, garments, and other products. Franco-
Mauritians who had amassed capital in the sugar industr, and Sino-Mauritians who had
become wealthy through trade, were eager to establish links to the new foreign firms,
who acted as catalysts for local investment. Much as in the "Third Italy" ofEmilia
Romagna, local firms soon sprang up to take advantage of the fact that the garment
export industr is subject to unpredictability, with frequently very rapid tuaround
demanded on "rush" orders that a single factory may be hard pressed to meet on time.
When a foreign factory needed to send some tasks out to local firms, they would at the
same time train the local firm to meet their quality requirements. These frequent
demands for subcontractors, as well as the ability ofMaurtian firms to attract workers
who had been trained in foreign firms and who brought useful skills into local firms,
spread capacity throughout the industr. At present, Mauritian owners account for about
60 percent ofthe capital invested in export production in Mauritius.
Finally, Afrca-Asia linkages are also present in Lesotho, where many Hong Kong
and Taiwanese investors have set up garent factories, and in Kenya, which receives
considerable Indian investment, and where Kenyan Indian entrepreneurs have recently
established export processing "parks" on their own (Himbara 1994: 66).
Industrial c1usters that star with trade like that in Nnewi, or with artisan, like the
Suame Magazine in Kumasi, Ghana, are historically determined and may build slowly.
In Indonesia, where these clusters are common, regression analysis suggests that
agglomeration economies go far toward explaining regional enterprise concentration in
Indonesia. Yet as van Dierman notes, "the mere occurence of c1usters does not
guarantee that productive networks wil develop and agglomeration economies wI1
accrue to individual enterprises within the c1usters" (1997: 29). Clusters of specialized
industres may be unable to move toward the kind of collaboration found in Mauritius.
Sometimes, the characteristics of an industry willlend themselves to the development of
collaboration and horizontal relations. Garent manufactue is one good example of
this, where a process that could be vertically integrated is instead disaggregated and
parts are given to subcontractors. As Pederson notes, this may be rare in Afrc!!:
Many of the small industri al c1usters found in Afrca appear to have developed out of
market towns rather than out ofvertical sectoral disaggregation. They are often
characterized by very limited vertical specialization and diversification and may develop
into c1usters ofpetty commodity producers rather than full-blown industr al clusters.
This may be one reason for the limited success of many Afrcan enterprise c1usters
(1997: 22-23).
McCormick's work in Kenya underscores this conc1usion. She found in the c1usters that
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occured on the low technology end of the garment market "very limited contracting of
specialized services" (1997: 1 1 7). The mass producers of garents were 100 percent
Asian, while the custom tailors were 95 percent Afrcan. In this case, networks differed
greatly, being segregated by ethnicity and level of education. McCormick argues that
entrepreneural networks explain why some manufacturers produce more efficiently than
others, and why some have more potential for growth.
Recent work by economists has begun to quantify the advantages networks may
(or may not) provide to entrepreneurs in Asia and in Afrca. Stanford economist Marcel
Fafchamps has established that personal networks do give entrepreneurs in Kenya and
Zimbabwe signficant, preferential access to supplier credit (1996a, 1998a; 1998b). The
kinds of networks that could benefit from this access generally were limited to non-
indigenous groups who could easily identify each other: Europeans and "Asians", who
had access to information about the reliability of others in their network, but not those
outside. Research by Oxford economist Abigail Bar suggests that network diversity
among Ghanaian manufacturers is signficant in explaining productivity differences
between enterprises . Bar demonstrates that networking helps Ghanaian entrepreneurs
achieve increasing retums to scale, facilitating enterprise expansion (1997). Her work
suggests as well that networks can be divided into two ideal tyes: "solidarity" and
"innovation" networks (1998). While solidarty networks serve more to reduce
uncertainty for entrepreneurs in marginal and traditional industries, innovation_ networks
provide relatively larger, more modem enterprises with the information they require
about technologies, markets, and the extemal world. Van Dierman also notes that in his
study of Jakara's low technology garment and wood future entrepreneurs, "dense
networks ofinter-firm linkages were not signficant" in their growth (1997: 195). But
Richard Doner's research in Thailand suggests that Chinese informal credit networks
and trading company links are still very important, especially during periods of
economic downtu, and "for those firms just moving into manufacture for export"
(1992: 212-213).
Governent policies can promote subcontracting and other kinds of linkages,
although it is not c1ear that Southeast Asian or Afrcan countres have been effective in
these efforts. Indonesia, for example, began in the late 1980s to actively promote
linkages between foreign and domestic firms with a well-enforced local content scheme,
and linkages between large and smaller firms with the "Bapak-Angkat" (foster father)
scheme. When these programs are evaluated, we may leam more about their usefulness.
Entrepreneurs and the State
Entrepreneurs require an "enabling state" to provide the policy framework,
supportive services, and the public goods of a social and physical infrastrcture.
Governent offcials are more likely to support their entrepreneurs if they can identify
private sector industrialization as being in their interest. Both Southeast Asia ~nd Sub-
Saharan Afrca have had challenges in this area. For example, James Jesudason notes
that in Malaysia, "the lack of co-operation between the state and Chinese capital has
compromised the nation's ability to enhance its technological capabilities and develop a
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strong manufacturing sector" (1990: 161). Likewise, Coughlin comments that in Kenya,
"Afrcans own very few medium or large-sized manufacturing firms. This has seriously
impeded an identification of interests between local industralists and the political
circ1es. As a result, the governents economic policies and bureaucratic decisions are
frequently detrimental to the nation's long-term industralIzation" (1988: 293).
The World Ban's study on the East Asian "mirac1e" gave some of the credit for
East Asia's success to the relationship between entrepreneurs and the state. In particular,
states were said to have engaged in productive discussions with their entrepreneurs,
receiving and giving guidance on industrialization. While this does seem to characterize
the northem tier of Asian countres, with Japan as the foremost example, this kind of
consultation has been nascent at best in Southeast Asia. Yet the countries there have
made some efforts to institute consultative mechanisms (World Ban 1993: 183-84).
Malaysia is probably the furthest along in this regard, and its major formal consultations
only began in 1991. As of 1993, Indonesia had no formal governent-business links for
policy coordination, and although Thailand did establish such links, there is
considerable debate over whether or not they have been effective.
States also have the option of direct intervention to promote entrepreneurship.
Again, both regions have attempted to "indigenize" their productive base. The-
Southeast Asian countries seem to have been more serious about using governent to
provide a boost to indigenous entrepreneurs. For example, Indonesia promoted
indigenous investment in oil sector support services by c10sing certain services to
foreign investment and allowing only indigenous firms to bid. The governent also
promulgated "buy Indonesian" procurement regulations for all governent agencies in
1980 (Aden, 1992: 94). In Malaysia, where the state was "relatively autonomous from
the dominant foreign and Chinese business groups," its desire both to promote.Malay
interests and larger-scale projects led to joint ventures between state enterprises (with
shares held in trst for Malays) and foreigners (Jesudason, 1990: 176,200). Whle the
governent could have promoted subcontracting to build up the capacity of the small
and medium-size entrepreneurs in Malaysia, most ofthese entrepreneurs were Chinese,
and thus the state chose the option of creating a new business class among the Malays.
Indonesia did institute a program to support small and medium-size enterprises, but the
low leve! of state capacity hindered the outcome of the program (World Bank 1993:
181).
Recent work on industral clusters, districts, and regions such as Baden
Würtenberg in Germany, Sakak Township in Japan, and Emilia Romagna in Italy point
to the important influence of regional and muncipal governents, in addition to, or
instead of, national governents, in providing an enabling environment, establishing
supportive institutions and public goods, and encouraging industrialization (Weiss,
1988; Friedman, 1988; Piore and Sabel, 1984). There is, however, little evidence that
regional and municipal governents have had this kind of nurtring role in either
Southeast Asia, or Sub-Saharan Afrca.
Foreign Joint Ventures in Southeast Asia and the Role of Japan
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It is next to impossible to discuss the dynamism of local entrepreneurship in
Southeast Asia without discussing its relationship with foreign capital. Foreignjoint
ventues have been the major form ofintemationallinkage in Southeast Asia,
transferrng technology and skills to local investors. Foreign firms acted as catalysts,
and their role has diminished over time as local firms have gained access to the same
international networks, skilled personneI, equipment, and information. Critical to this
process has been the role of Japan and other Asian investors, who tend to behave quite
differently from European and U.S. investors.
The story of foreign investment in Southeast Asia has been one of continual
change. For example, in 1974 in Malaysia, foreign firms produced nearly 50 percent of
manufactung output, and made up 11 percent offirms. Ten years later, this had
dropped to 35 percent of output and 7.6 percent offirms (Ali and Kam, 1993: 83). In
par this was a response to the NEP which led many British firms to withdraw from
Malaysia. But the same phenomenon has also been observed in Thailand. In the mid-
1960s, Japanese companies owned most of the textile industry in Thailand, but by the
1980s, most were owned by Thai firms (Yoshihara, 1988: 19). Yet the World Bank's
study on East Asia stated that most of Thailand's manufactured exports "are produced
by foreign investors or joint ventures" implying that the foreign role is stil quite large,
at least in the export sectors (1993: 142).
Foreign investors need incentives to source their component supplies locally, and
Southeast Asian governents have been actively promoting joint ventures as a
mechanism for the transfer of skills. For garents, the skills are relatively easy to
transfer. Skill requirements are higher in electronics, but many Malaysian fimis are now
exporting indirectly through supplying components to foreign assemblers. In Indonesia,
domestic entrepreneurs "thrved" by entering joint ventues with foreign firms in
"textiles, electronics, glass manufactue, pharaceuticals, and finance" (Robison, 1 992:
71). Ownership data don't always reflect local-foreign linkages. For example,
economist Hal Hill notes that in Indonesia, "most firms in the manufactung sector have
some kind of commercial involvement with foreign parties" , either through
subcontracting or marketing arrangements (1996: 165).
More than other nationalities, Japanese firms are likely to be the parters in these
foreign linkages, and Japanese firms are not only more likely to enter into joint ventures,
they are more likely to be using technology that is transferable to partners at the skill
levels present in Southeast Asia. Japan has a long presence in Southeast Asia (and a
briefpresence in Afrca). Trading firms such as Mitsubishi had already established
outposts in Southeast Asia by 1917. Because Japan has been such an active trading
partner in Southeast Asia, when local traders decided to move into industr, they
frequently did so with assistance from their Japanese distrbutors, much as Nnewi
traders in Nigeria did later with their Taiwanese distrbutors. For example, Thai trading
groups in the 1950s and 1960s moved into manufacturng under ISI policies, producing
the same products they had formerly been importing. About a third of the 211 industr al
firms owned by the major trading groups were joint ventures with foreign firms; of
these, 80 percent were with Japanese firms (Suehiro, 1992: 54-55).
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Japanese firms often entered into joint ventues as minority parners, often with
Chinese businessmen who "provided important distribution networks which were vital
for the Japanese because they were newcorners and specialized in consumer goods"
(Jesudason, 1990: 58). Yet governent actions to promote indigenous interests in
Malaysia led to a drop in Chinese paricipation in these joint ventures. Between 1970
and 1975,40 percent of Japanese investment was injoint ventures with Chinese firms,
and 18 percent with state enterprises or Malay firms. By 1976-1980 with more
emphasis by the governent on Malay paricipation, joint ventures with Chinese firms
dropped to 29 percent, and ventures with Malay interests (including the state) rose to 54
percent (Jesudason, 1990: 153).
Japanese investment tends to come in waves, whenever the yen is highly valued,
making exports from Japan itselfuncompetitive. The problems Japan has experienced
over the past several years have also led to a fall off in new joint venture investment.
Although Japanese firms had stared to invest in Sub-Saharan Afrca, their moyes were
tentative. For example, not one of the auto assembly firmjoint ventures in Nigeria were
with Japanese firms, whereas Japanese firms dominate auto assembly in Southeast Asia.
Afrca has been far more likely to receive investment from Europe and the US., and
firms from these countres, the US. in paricular, seem far more likely to remain wholly
owned, and to invest only in high capital, extractive ventues.
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AN CONCLUSIONS
To function effectively in a global economy, the entrepreneurs of Southeast Asia
and Sub-Saharan Afrca will not be able to avoid the kinds of evolution that modem
business es around the world experience. They wI1 move toward public listing of their
stocks, greater specialization and capital mobility, modem management technques.
Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia got an early start in par due to the strength of the
Chinese c1an and dialect networks. But some evidence suggests that entrepreneurs
move away from reliance on these networks as other institutions develop to take their
place: formal baning systems, trade fairs and trade promotion efforts, etc. Furhermore,
as Ruth Mc V ey points out, "The need to act in an increasingly intemationalized business
world imposes forms and behavior which erode Chinese exc1usivity" (1992: 26).
Already this is happening, particularly in Southeast Asia. By the mid-19th
centur, for example, the guild-like dialect organzations that organzed commerce
among the Chinese were being replaced by more "modem" forms "such as bus.iness
parnerships, alliances and trade associations" (Brown, 1994: 128). Sieh suggests that
the new economic groups in Malaysia are different from older groups (1992: 106-108).
They are more diversified, rely more on professional management, tend to grow more
through acquisition than through greenfield investment, make more use of extemal
finance: stock issues, ban borrowing, and are less risk-averse. Malay entrepreneurs also
appear to be moving away from patronage relations and reliance on state protections,
paricularly as they grow more experienced and confident (McVey, 1992: 26). Business
groups in Thailand have been slower to grow away from family connections toward the
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ideal-type modem corporation, with its impersonal character, but Mackie argues that the
trend in this direction is quite visible (1992: 176). Mackie also notes that the Chinese in
Indonesia are making less use of political connections as their business es become
competitive intemationally (1992: 179).
This kind of evolution is assisted by the establishment of institutions such as stock
markets, a more efficient means of raising capital through reputation without relying on
networks. Indeed, this process has probably gone furthest in Malaysia, where the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange was established in 1973. The stock market "made it much
easier for larger Chinese companies to advance beyond the single- family firm toward
more complex pattems of interlocking share ownership and control, bringing very large
sums of capital within the grasp of a single group through takeovers, capital issues, and
share swaps" (Mackie, 1992: 171). Conversely, although Thailand has had a stock
exchange since 1975, it did not apparently played a signficant role in capital
mobilization until the late 1980s. Indonesia was later in establishing a stock exchange,
but its market too only began to take off in the late 1980s (World Bank, 1993: 226). It
would be useful to know just what attributes a stock exchange needs to enable local
entrepreneurs to avail themselves of its opportunities. This would be useful for Afrcan
countries, many ofwhom have recently established stock exchanges.
Governents in Southeast Asia also made good use of import substitution (ISI)
policies to push their traders into manufactung. Increasing import duties on consumer
goods like textiles and simple electronics has long been a stimulus to move accumulated
capital into production. Since traders have the contacts with foreign distributors and
networks of information that can make this process easier, they are the logical group to
push. Afrcan countres had a later start at ISI than Southeast Asia, and they had
probably not made full use ofthis role ofISI in getting local production of consumer
goods stared before they were swept into the river of liberalization in strctural
adjustment programs in the 1980s. For example, the Nnewi traders in Nigeria were
stimulated to shift to manufactung only by new restrctions imposed in the early 1980s
on the goods they were importing. Nigeria liberalized trade considerably under a
strctural adjustment program adopted in 1986, exposing these new manufactuers to the
international market. It is important when liberalizing trade not to "throw the baby out
with the bath water." Infant industry protection has a rationale in both theory and
practice, and many economists have argued that countries should first promote exports,
and only later open up to imports.
When considering what kinds of policies might best boost local entrepreIieurship
in Afrca, this review c1early points in the direction of enabling linkages and networks.
Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia had the advantage of a history of global economic
activity, and a modem history of linkages with a regional powerhouse, Japan. While the
recent economic crisis shows that such informal regional integration can have severe
costs, the alternative is not autarchy, but rather more careful crafting ofregulations and
institutions that promote regional investment, joint ventures, etc. The only likely
neighborly powerhouse in Sub-Saharan Afrca is South Afrca, although Maurtius has
begun to export capital to neighboring countres (Bräutigam, 1998). Informal
institutions in the private sector, paricularly private sector linkages and networks that
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can help overcome information scarcities and reduce trans action and search costs, were
critical in Southeast Asia. It is possible that developed countres can help form linkages
by providing forums for information exchange and networking to take place, or assisting
in certification programs that can help substitute for long years of face-to-face contacts
in buIlding confidence among network partners.
Furher research is needed on local entrepreneurship in both areas, paricularly in
sub-Saharan Afrca. We don't know much about the positive role of foreign investment
and linkages there, since most ofthe research on foreign investment in Afrca has been
conducted from a critical viewpoint. More studies like David Himbara's of the Kenyan
Indian capitalists (1994a, 1994b) would also be very useful for a better understanding of
the opportnities avaI1able to Sub-Saharan countries who have rich entreprenuerial
cultures avaI1able in their non-Afrcan populations. Maurtius may provide guidance
here. It is also likely that firms embedded in business networks that span national
borders will have different attitudes toward liberalization: they are likely to be more
"outward oriented" than those with only local networks, and this eventually will help
promote trade in both regions (MI1ner 1988).
The road out of poverty for Southeast Asia and Afrca willlikely be built on the
dynamism of the entrepreneurs in each region, but only to the extent that their
governents can provide political and economic stability, and the basic public goods of
education and infrastrcture. There is much that remains in the realm of myth 'and
"stylized facts" about Southeast Asian and Afrcan entrepreneurs: stories about ethnc
exc1usion, cronyism and rent-seeking are contradicted by other stories about dynamism,
productivity, and global competitiveness. The relations between entrepreneursand the
state have been uneven in both regions, with ethnicity providing a common thread
underlying governent policy choices. The challenge for governents concemed with
ethnc equity is to promote growth while at the same time promoting greater inc1usion in
the rewards of growth. Much room remains in Sub-Saharan Afrca, and in Southeast
Asia, for learnng from the most successful of each region's entrepreneurs. For many
years, entrepreneurs in both regions have been building globalized networks that take
advantage of markets, but in some senses, substitute for them as wel1. Understanding
more about the function of networks and entrepreneuriallinkages in developing
countres may help in fine-tuning programs and policies to enable more Afrcan and
Southeast Asian entrepreneurs to compete in an increasingly globalized economy.
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